This paper uses a sequence of government budget constraints to motivate estimates of returns on the U.S. Federal government debt. Our estimates differ conceptually and quantitatively from the interest payments reported by the U.S. government. We use our estimates to account for contributions to the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio made by inflation, growth, and nominal returns paid on debts of different maturities.
inflate away much of the debt by using inflation to pay negative real rates of return?
Occasionally, but not usually. Did high net-of-interest deficits propel the debt-GDP ratio upward? Considerably during World War II, but not too much after that. How much did growth in GDP contribute to holding down the debt-GDP ratio? A lot. How much did variations in returns across maturities affect the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio? At times substantially, but on average not much since the end of World War II.
The government budget constraint determines the evolution of the ratio of government debt to GDP. We use an accounting scheme that emerges from a decomposition of the government's period-by-period budget constraint, to be described and justified in section 2. We use prices of indexed and nominal debt of each maturity to construct one-period holding period returns on government IOU's of various maturities. Multiplying the vector of returns by the vector of quantities outstanding each period provides the measure of returns that appear in the government budget constraint.
Of necessity, our answers to these questions rely on our own estimates of returns on government debt, not the series for interest payments reported by the U.S. government.
1
The U.S. government's interest payments series was not designed to measure the returns that appear in the government budget constraint. Instead, the government's series isolates the government's out-of-pocket period-by-period cash dispersals used to service its debt.
2
The government's interest payments series answers the question "how many dollars must the Treasury devote to paying coupons on this period's outstanding government bonds while rolling over the nominal stock of treasury bills?" 3 The following observation highlights the essential difference in the questions being answered by the government's accounting system and ours. 4 Through a suitable debtmanagement policy, the Treasury could drive the government's measure of interest payments to zero every period, even though from the point of view of the government budget 1 Earlier researchers have also noticed the discrepancy between the concept underlying the government series on interest payments and the concept that appears in the government budget constraint. See Blanchard and Sachs (1981), Boskin (1982) , Penner (1982) , Eisner and Pieper (1984) , Congressional Budget Office (1985) , and Bohn (1992) . 2 The government figures reported by the Treasury and recorded in the National Income and Product Accounts are prepared by the Bureau of the Public Debt. 3 As we document in Appendix B.1, the government's concept leaves out capital gains and losses on Treasury notes and bonds obligations, a feature that is revealed by the absence of holding period returns for longer maturity government obligations in the government's formula for computing interest payments. Those capital gains and losses appear automatically in the law of motion for government debt, a.k.a. the government budget constraint. 4 We describe the relationship between the government's accounting system and ours in detail in Appendix B.
constraint, it truly could be paying substantial interest that would propel the government debt-GDP ratio upward. The government could set officially measured interest payments to zero, for example, by issuing only zero-coupon 10 year bonds and perpetually rolling them over each year. These bonds would never pay coupons. They would never mature because each year they would be repurchased as nine year zero-coupon bonds and be replaced by newly issued 10 year zero-coupon bonds. Of course, although the government's accounts would put interest payments at zero, in truth the government would still pay interest in the sense determined by its budget constraint. 5 
Interest payments in the government budget constraint
Let Y t be real GDP at t, and let B t be the real value of IOU's from the government to the public. That least controversial equation of macroeconomics, the government budget constraint, accounts for how a nominal interest rate r t−1,t , net inflation π t−1,t , net growth in real GDP g t−1,t , and the net-of-interest deficit def t combine to determine the evolution of the government debt-GDP ratio:
The appropriate concept of a nominal return r t−1,t is one that verifies this equation.
The nominal return r t−1,t and the real stock of debt B t in equation (1) are averages across terms to maturity. To bring out some of the consequences of interest rate risk and the maturity structure of the debt for the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio, we refine equation (1) to recognize that the government pays different nominal one-period holding period returns on the IOUs of different maturities that compose B t . LetB t−1,t be the net nominal holding period return between t − 1 and t on nominal zero-coupon bonds of maturity j; letr j t−1,t be the net real holding period return between t − 1 and t on inflation indexed zero coupon bonds of maturity j. 7 
Then
5 The government would be paying out interest in the form of the capital gains earned by the sellers of zero-coupon nine year bonds. 6 Where p t is the price level at time t, p t = (1 + π t−1,t )p t . 7 In a nonstochastic version of the growth model that is widely used in macroeconomics and public the government budget constraint expresses the following law of motion for the debt-GDP
Equation (2) distinguishes contributions to the growth of the debt-GDP ratio that depend on debt maturity j from those that don't. In particular, π t−1,t and g t−1,t don't depend on j and operate on the total real value of debt last period; but the holding-period returnsr 
Accounting details
At each date t, we compute the number of dollars the government has at date t promised to pay at each date t + j, j ≥ 1. A coupon bond is a stream of promised coupons plus an ultimate principal payment. We regard such a bond as a bundle of zero-coupon bonds of different maturities and price it by unbundling it into the underlying component zero-coupon bonds, one for each date at which a coupon or principal is due, valuing each promised payment separately, then adding up these values. In other words, we strip the coupons from each bond and price a bond as a weighted sum of zero coupon bonds of maturities j = 1, 2, ..., n. 8 We treat nominal bonds and inflation-indexed bonds separately. For nominal bonds, let s t t+j be the number of time t+j dollars that the government has at time t promised to deliver. To compute s t t+j from historical data, we add up all of the dollar principal-plus-coupon payments that the government has at time t promised to deliver at date t + j. Because zero-coupon bond prices were not directly observable until prestripped coupon bonds were introduced in 1985, we extract the nominal implicit forward rates from government bond finance, the net holding period return on debt is identical for zero-coupon bonds of all maturities (e.g., see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2011, chapter 11) . The presence of risk and possibly incomplete markets changes that. 8 The market and the government already do this. Prestripped coupon bonds are routinely traded.
price data. We then convert these nominal forward rates on government debt into prices of claims on future dollars. Let q t t+j be the number of time t dollars that it takes to buy a dollar at time t + j:
where ρ jt is the time t yield to maturity on bonds with j periods to maturity. The yield curve at time t is a graph of yield to maturity ρ jt against maturity j. Let n be the longest maturity outstanding. 
where it is to be understood that q t t = 1 andq t t = v t . The left hand side of equation (3) is the real value of the interest bearing debt at the end of period t. The right side of equation (3) is the sum of the real value of the primary deficit def t and the real value of the outstanding debt that the government owes at the beginning of the period, which in turn is simply the real value this period of outstanding promises to deliver future dollars s t−1 t−1+j and goodss t−1 t−1+j that the government issued last period.
To attain the government budget constraint in the form of equation (2) 
To recognize that this equation is equivalent with (2), use the definitions
To implement budget constraint (4) , but for the nonmarketable components, implicit returns must somehow be synthesized. In section 2.2, we describe in detail how we did that.
Data
Our data are end-of-year observations from 1941 to 2009. As described in Appendix A, the total outstanding debt held by the public is the sum of the marketable (i.e Treasury bills, notes, bonds, and TIPS) and nonmarketable (i.e., savings bonds, and special issues to state and local governments) debt. We obtained prices and quantities of marketable nominal bonds from the CRSP Monthly Government Bond File. 
10
The Federal Government reports its receipts, expenditures, and interest payments in two places: the annual budget issued by the Treasury and the NIPA. We use fiscal data from the NIPA Table 3 .2 to compute the primary deficit rather than budget data from the Treasury for two reasons. First, the Treasury reports data for the fiscal year, which runs from October to September while we measure returns on a calendar year basis. Second, NIPA interest payments (NIPA Table 3 .2, line 28) exclude interest paid to other government trust funds, such as the Social Security trust fund. Interest on the public debt reported by the Treasury includes interest paid to these trust funds. NIPA interest payments include interest paid to the Military and Civil Service retirement funds. We net out these payments using data on NIPA table 3.18B, line 24. We compute output growth rates using real GDP from the NIPA. For the value of currency v t , we take the inverse of the fourth quarter observation of the GDP price deflator.
The left side of equation (3) is the real value of the interest bearing debt held by the public at the end of period t. To compute the contribution that marketable debt makes to this sum, instead of estimating quantities of zero coupons bonds and their prices as we do (i.e., computing the s t t+j sequences and estimating a zero-coupon yield curve), we could just multiply the vector of market prices by the vector of the quantities outstanding for each security . These alternative calculations yield nearly identical debt series.
11
Of course, an advantage of our computation that uses estimates of {q t t+j } and {s t t+j } is that we can 9 In the CRSP data set the quantity of publicly held marketable debt only goes back to 1960. We extended this series using data from the Treasury Bulletin. 10 These yield curves are available from http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm. 11 If this were not the case, it would signal errors in our zero-coupon yield curves.
decompose returns by maturity.
Ipso facto, market prices for the nonmarketable portion of the debt are unavailable.
Therefore, we proceeded as follows. We obtained the par value of the total nonmarketable debt held by the public from Table 6 ).
13
Since we compute the returns on the marketable debt directly, our estimates of these returns are not sensitive to how either the primary deficit or the value of the nonmarketable debt is measured. By way of contrast, estimates that some other authors have created are sensitive to how the primary deficit and the value of nonmarketable debt are measured. Eisner and Pieper (1984) , Eisner (1986) , and Bohn (1992) computed measures of the government's interest payments that are conceptually similar to ours. But instead of computing the terms on the left side of (3) directly, they used the inter-temporal budget constraint (1) to compute total returnsr t−1,tBt−1 as the change in the market value of debt minus the primary deficit. An advantage of that alternative approach is that it avoids using data on pricing kernels q t t+j and promised payments s t t+j . Instead, the market value of the debt can be computed directed from the observed prices and quantities outstanding of government bonds.
14 However, while in theory the government budget identity (2) should hold exactly, with measured series this equation carries residuals that have several sources. Early in the sample, much of the data from the NIPA are reported to just two (and in some cases just 12 See figure 12 in Appendix A for a plot of this ratio. 13 The Cox and Hirschhorn (1983) series has been updated and is available from http://www.dallasfed.org/data/data/natdebt.tab.htm.
14 We will employ a similar strategy in section 3 as one of two ways to estimate the returns on the nonmarketable portion of the debt.
one!) significant digits. While we have tried to minimize discrepancies, there are still small differences between the NIPA fiscal data and the Treasury's accounting. 15 Further, the change in the market value of the debt is sensitive to the definition of the debt (e.g. should the monetary base be included or not?, How should debt from government corporations and agencies or government assets such as gold be treated?). The computed return series will be a weighted average of the securities included. Further, the primary deficit series should be consistent with the choice of securities. Discrepancies between the debt and deficit series will corrupt any measure of returns computed as a residual. 16 We prefer our calculations because they avoid some (but not all) of these measurement error issues. Furthermore, our calculations also allow us (a) to account for the different holding-period returns on obligations of different maturities and thereby form the decompositions of interest payments in table 2 and figures 3 and 6, (b) to execute counterfactual debt management experiments, and (c) to dissect the difference between our estimates of the interest costs and those reported by the Treasury. We turn to this last task in Appendix B.
Contributions to the evolution of the U.S. debt-GDP ratio
To set the stage for the role that interest rate risks will play in our story, figure 1 shows the evolution of the government's promised nominal marketable payments s 16 Nevertheless, the two approaches lead to similar results quantitatively. For the period in which our study overlaps with Bohn's (1948 Bohn's ( to 1989 , his return series and ours move together, although ours is more volatile, particularly during the 1980s; the mean and standard deviation of our value-weighted return series is 1.64 and 4.28, compared with 2.42 and 3.19, respectively, for Bohn's return series. The correlation coefficient between his return series and ours is 0.76. 
18,19
Figure 4 reveals that while longer maturities have generally been associated with higher and more volatile returns, returns on bonds maturing in 15, 20, and 30 years were on average lower than those for adjacent maturities. We suspect that this outcome partly, but not entirely, reflects investors' preferences for newly issued or so-called 'on the run' securities. Figure 5 plots the average maturity, in years, of the marketable Treasury debt held by the public along with the ratios of the marketable and total debt held by the public to GDP 17 These large swing in the returns occur even if we estimate the yield curves use Waggoner's (1997) method on the CRSP price data instead of using Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright's (2007) yield curves.
18 A principal aim of stochastic discount factor models like the one proposed by Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) is to capture how means and standard deviations of one-period holding-period returns depend on maturity.
19 TIPS are not included in the holding-period returns in these graphs. What contributions did inflation, growth, and compound interest make to the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio depicted in figure 5 ? To answer this question, we takeB
as an initial condition at time t − τ and iterate on (2) to arrive at the following useful decomposition:
Before describing the results of applying decomposition (11), we briefly describe how we addressed issues associated with the presence of nonmarketable government debt withiñ
To compute the return on the nonmarketable portion of the debt, we use two alternative methods summarized in table 1.
20
Under the heading "Nominal Return I" (column 10), we report the average return on the entire stock of nonmarketable debt that makes equation (2) hold with equality. Under the heading "Nominal Return II" (column 11), we report the return computed by assuming that the average return on the nonmarketable portion of the debt is the same as the average return on the marketable portion of the debt. When using the column (11) method, equation (2) will not necessarily hold with equality. In column (12), we report the size of the residual in equation (2) left under this column (11) way of computing the return. Contributions from the marketable debt and the primary deficit are computed independently from the nonmarketable debt and so are unaffected by any assumptions made about the nonmarketable debt. Reassuringly, the two methods deliver similar contributions for four of the six subperiods. The two subperiods in which the two contributions diverge (1981-1993 and 1993-2001) were periods in which long term bond-holders did particularly well. If the maturity structure across the marketable and nonmarketable debt differs substantially, the column (11) way of computing the return will be biased during periods in which the slope of the yield curve is changing dramatically. Figure 7 and tables 1 and 2 report elements of a decomposition based on equation (11) .
In particular, for various values of t and τ , (ii) inflation, (iii) GDP growth, and (iv) the primary deficit for both the marketable and the nonmarketable portions of the debt. Table 2 then decomposes the nominal interest payments, inflation, and GDP growth components for the marketable debt by maturity. Figure 7 shows the contributions toB
depicted on the right side of (2). The nominal returns series plotted in the top left panel is the sum of the three series plotted in figure 3 . Figure 8 plots the inflation rate, the growth rate of real GDP, and the value weighted return on the government's debt portfolio. For the first half of the sample, the growth rate of GDP exceeded the return on the debt, while in the second half of the sample, the return on the government debt exceeded the growth rate. Tables 1 and 2 and figures 6, 7, and 8 reveal the following patterns in the way that the U.S. grew, inflated, and paid its way toward higher or lower debt-GDP ratios: 
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The average maturity of the debt was around 7 years right after WWII.
(b) 31.8 was due to growth in real GDP.
(c) 34.7 was due to running primary surpluses 2. During the 1970s, the U.S. continued to inflate away part of the debt, but the magnitudes were small. columns (6)-(9) include both the marketable nominal bonds and the TIPS. column (10) is the return component of the nonmarketable debt computed as a residual to equation (2) . column (11) is the return component of the nonmarketable debt assuming the return on the nonmarketable debt is equal to the return on the marketable debt.
column (12) = column (10) -column (11) . column (5) is approximately the sum of columns (6), (7), (9) , (10), (13), (15) Top left panel, value weighted return on the government's debt portfolio; top right, the inflation rate, bottom left, the growth rate of real GDP. In the bottom right plot, the solid blue line is the growth rate in real GDP, the red dot-dashed lined is the inflation rate, and the black dashed line is the value-weighted nominal return on the government's portfolio of debt.
debt was low (around 2 years), the government was unable to nail the long-term bond holders as it had done immediately after WWII. percent with a standard deviation of 4.9 percent. Figure 9 reveals three especially striking outcomes:
1. There were large negative returns immediately after World War II.
2. There were large positive returns in the early 1980s after Volcker brought down inflation. 
24
This has reawakened concerns that rising government interest payments could eventually unleash inflation or other painful fiscal readjustments via 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic' (Sargent and Wallace (1981) ).
25
Growing interest payments play a key role in that unpleasant arithmetic. So to frame the tradeoffs and risks facing the United States, it is important to account appropriately for the interest that the U.S. government pays to the public and the abundant interest rate risks that the government shares with its creditors. To account for these payments and risks and to measure their contributions to the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio accurately, we advocate computing the real returns on government debts of each maturity.
Finally, we wish to indicate how the government's way of accounting for interest payments and the quantity of debt might help explain a peculiar preference long expressed by the experts who are responsible for designing the term structure of coupon payments of U.S. Treasury bonds.
26
The authorities have sought to set the coupon rate on a long-term Treasury bond in a way that makes the initial market value of a bond equal to its par value.
27
It is impossible to understand such a preference by using, for example, the theory of optimal debt management provided by Lucas and Stokey (1983) .
But consider the following imperfect rationalization based on the government's reported measure of interest payments and its practice of reporting the par value rather than the market value of its debt.
28
Recall that when a coupon bond sells at par, its yield to maturity equals its coupon rate. Assuming an approximately flat term structure of interest rates, if 27 See Dewey (chapter XIII, 1902) for how these preferences played a significant role in controversies surrounding the design of bonds by the U.S. Congress during the Civil War. In particular, Dewey discusses the failure of debt issues in 1862 and 1864 due to the Treasury's refusal to sell bonds below their par value. In 1864, Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase insisted on lowering the government's interest payments by issuing 5% coupon bonds (i.e., the ten-forties) in the place of 6% coupon bonds (i.e., the five-twenties). By insisting that these new bonds be sold at par despite current market interest rates that could not support that price, the initial issue of the ten-forties was (in Dewey's words) "a disaster."
28 See the discussion of figure 11 in appendix A.
the coupon rate is set so the market value is near the par value, then, at least initially, the government's accounting methods do a good job of approximating both the market value and the interest payments that belong in the government budget constraint.
A Reconciling Our Debt Series With Those Reported by the Bureau of the Public Debt
Much of the analysis in this paper focuses on computing the returns to the marketable debt held by the public. But this is only a portion of the total debt outstanding. In this appendix, we reconcile our measure of the marketable debt with estimates that include the nonmarketable debt and the debt held within the government.
In table 4 While marketable securities today represent the lion's share of the debt held by the public ($7.2 out of $7.8 trillion, or a little less than 93%), this has not always been the case. In figure 10 , we plot the debt-GDP ratio for three different measures of the debt: 1) the marketable debt held by the public; 2) the sum of the marketable and the nonmarketable debt held by the public; and 3) the total outstanding debt. Over the entire period, marketable debt has averaged about 80 percent of the total debt held by the public (i.e the ratio of the solid-blue line to the dashed-red line). Early in the sample, this ratio was about two-thirds, and it has steadily increased over time. Treasury securities or about 7.5% of the total debt outstanding. Currently, excluding the Federal Reserve, the public holds about $6,884 billion (about 56%) of the total debt. In figure 10 we can see that this share (the ratio of the dashed-red line to dot-dashed black line) has varied from over 80% during World War II to under 50% during the 2000s.
Treasury debt is typically reported at its par value -the face value or value of the principal outstanding. In our analysis we compute the market value -the value of the existing stock of Treasury securities at market prices. In figure 11 we report the par value and market value of the marketable debt held by the public as percents of GDP. These 
B Reconciling our estimates with the government's
As documented earlier by Hall and Sargent (1997) , our estimates of the interest paid on U.S. government debt differ substantially from those reported by the government. In this appendix, we isolate the differences between our way of accounting for interest and the government's. Since they give different answers, these two accounting systems must be The government reports the following object as its nominal interest payments at time t:
The term s "How many dollars must the government come up with this period to pay the coupons due on its debt while rolling over its stock of treasury bills?" It is worthwhile to have an answer to this interesting question, but it is not the question that our alternative concept of returns seeks to answer.
In figure 13 , we plot the government's official interest payments series and our concept (12) . Since the government's series includes interest payments on both the marketable and nonmarketable debt held by the public, while our data covers just the marketable debt held by the public, we divide our concept by the outstanding value of the marketable debt held by the public. The two series track each other quite closely: the correlation coefficient for the two series is 0.99.
In Figure 14 , we contrast the Federal Government official interest payment series with our interest payment series using annual end of the year data from 1941 to 2009. In this graph, we report both our measure of interest paid (dashed-dotted blue line) and the government's reported interest payments (dashed red line) as percentages of the market value of debt. As can be seen in this figure, our series is lower on average and considerably more volatile than the government's. As we report in table 5 the official interest payments average 5.20 percent of the debt while our measure of the real return on the debt averages 1.47. We then subtract the inflation rate from officially reported interest payments (solid black line). The two series have roughly the same mean (1.47 versus 1.63). Until the 1980s, it appears that much of the difference between the reported series and our series was due The dashed-red line in the officially reported interest costs divided by the outstanding value of the total debt held by the public. The solid blue line is equation (12) divided by the outstanding value of the marketable debt held by the public. The dot-dashed-blue line is our computed value weighted return on the marketable debt. The dashed-red line is the government's reported interest payments divided by the total debt held by the public. The solid-black line is the dashed-red line minus the inflation rate. 
isolates the sources of the discrepancies between the government's way of accounting for interest payments and ours. This expression reveals the following differences between the two accounting systems:
1. The term in braces is total coupon payments. But coupon payments should not be viewed purely as interest payments because they are partly principal repayments, partly interest payments. Our accounting method takes that into account, but the government's does not. (2), namely, the capital gains or losses that the government pays on its one-period zero coupon bonds; but . . . (13) evidently omits the capital gains or losses that the government pays on its zero coupon bonds of maturities longer than one-period. One-period holdingperiod returnsr j t−1,t ,r j t−1,t and promised coupon payments for maturities j exceeding 1 do not appear in (13) but they do in (2).
The termr

Expression
31 Whether or not the two series resemble each other after adjusting for inflation depends partly on debtmanagement policy. For example, as mentioned in section 1, there exist debt management policies that can set the government's interest payment series always to be identically zero.
